Since late 2012, the Central African Republic (CAR) has been under a protracted crisis triggered by the Muslim Seleka rebels’ military campaign against the government. By early 2013, the Seleka rebels took control of Capital city, Bangui by overthrowing then President Francois Bozizé. This resulted in the renewal of clashes between the various armed factions, and reports of widespread human rights abuses, including indiscriminate killings of civilians.
In response, by mid-2013, Christian and animist anti-balaka militias began organising to combat the Seleka rebels. However, these groups associated the Seleka with being Muslim and consequently carried out extensive reprisal attacks against Muslim civilians in Bangui and western regions of the country. By early 2014, the African Union and French forces successfully ousted the Seleka rebels from Bangui. The MINUSCA, the UN peacekeeping mission to CAR, took over the African Union’s mission by September 2014. Despite these interventions, violence and assaults on civilians persisted and the Seleka factionalised.
In 2016, Faustin-Archange Touadéra was elected as the President of CAR. Despite the presence of French troops and UN forces, he struggled to defeat the rebel forces. In 2018, an agreement was signed between the government of CAR and Russian authorities, outlining the training of their forces by Russian “specialists”, composed of primarily former military officers.
The UN, EU, US and France have reported the presence of the Wagner Group in CAR. According to the former Prime Minister of CAR, there was no contract between CAR and a Russian private security company but only a military cooperation agreement with Russia.
The Wagner Group is one of Russia’s most prominent PMCs and functions as “an unofficial (albeit nominally illegal) tool of Russian foreign policy”. It is an umbrella organisation with multiple entities and operations in different parts of the world, often described as Russia’s proxy military force playing a key role in Russia’s war with Ukraine. In January 2023, the US Treasury Department stated that the Group will be designated as a transnational criminal organisation (TCO). In September 2023, a draft order was laid before the UK Parliament to declare the Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation, under the Terrorism Act 2000.
The Wagner Group has protected the leadership of CAR through security enforcement, military training, shipments of weapons and propaganda campaigns for years. In exchange, it gained profitable mining concessions for gold, diamond and timber. In 2023, hundreds of soldiers from the Wagner Group arrived in CAR to “enhance security measures ahead of the country’s upcoming constitutional referendum”. This deployment was reportedly announced by the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), a group which has been linked to the PMC. This group has been labelled by the US as a front company for the Wagner Group’s operations in CAR.
Propaganda and misinformation campaigns have been a tactic employed by Wagner Group to “delegitimise opposition movements and create confusion among the public”. To control the emerging narrative, the Group funded the creation of radio station Lengo Songo which through its broadcasts, advances Russia’s views and ‘legitimises’ Wagner activities in the eye of the local public opinion. Furthermore, through its funds, the Group sponsored and produced films, including a cartoon framing Russian involvement in the CAR as constructive cooperation which showed a “friendly bear helping a lion fight off a group of hyenas” and an action movie filmed in the CAR depicting “Wagner personnel protecting the country from rebels”.
The Incidents
According to UN experts, instructors from the Wagner Group have been intimidating and harassing the civilians, peacekeepers, aid workers and minorities in CAR. UN experts believe that the Wagner Group, along with the local forces, are committing torture, arbitrary detention, summary execution, and more. There have been reports about alleged rape and sexual violence against both men and women. Multiple reports have been made of arbitrary detention and torture. For instance, one of the victims told UN investigators that he was held by a group of Russians, who beat him and cut off one of his fingers.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) first documented cases of abuse by the Russia-linked forces in 2019. According to interviews conducted by the HRW, over 12 civilians mentioned an incident in July 2021, where at least 12 unarmed men were killed by Russian speaking weapon bearers. In another incident, a group of men was accused of being rebels and unlawfully detained by CAR armed forces in inhumane conditions in an open pit at a military base. It was reported that both Russian speaking weapon bearers and CAR soldiers beat five of the detained men.
In May 2023, residents in one of the subdivisions of Bangui went on strike against the “continuous harassment, kidnappings, torture, and intimidation” of the people living in the quarter and the country as a whole by Russian mercenaries of the Wagner security group”.
Human rights violations also occur in other Wagner operating zones including Mali and Sudan. In Mali, women have continuously been targeted by Malian troops and members of foreign security partners. A UN report found that “sexual violence is being used as a war tactic and in a systemic manner” and accused Malian troops and their foreign security partners suspected of including Wagner personnel to have executed 500 people, engaged in sexual violence and torture during an operation in the village of Moura. Additionally, French forces reported Wagner fighters digging and burying bodies in a mass grave. Although they were caught on video, Wagner Group edited the footage with hopes of altering the narrative, wrongfully accusing the French military of the incident and advancing the “anti-French and anti-Western sentiment in Mali”.
Sudan also faces challenges considering the presence of the Group in its rich gold mines. Survivors of the attack reported that miners were killed in a gold mine located between the border of Sudan and CAR while Wagner looted the mine for its resources. Claims state the Wagner troops shot “indiscriminately” killing more than 70 in that single incident.
Legal Aspects
Investigations
Despite the allegations made, there has been no prosecution of any Russian linked forces in CAR. In 2021, a Special Commission of Inquiry was set up by the CAR government. The Commission found that there have been violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including by these Russian instructors.
In 2022, the UN announced that it would be investigating the allegation of the massacre of 10 civilians by Russian mercenaries and CAR army officers in Gordile and Ndah villages.
The question of whether the Wagner Group meets the definition of a PMSC under the Montreux Document or a PSC under the ICoC remains contested. Furthermore, its employees could qualify as mercenaries, under the definition of international humanitarian law. Wagner Group is itself “nebulous because the actors themselves assume amorphous forms”. Wagner Group operates in a grey zone, fluctuating between the two, hence why it is challenging to regulate their conduct and flag observed violations since they engage in such a diverse range of activities.
Although transnational regulations and voluntary industry codes of conduct like the ICoC exist and provide a regulatory framework and mechanism, they also have limits when attempting to regulate actors operating “with significant state backing and secrecy”. Although complicated to define under international law, Wagner may become a model for others, with a continuing emergence of similar groups that stand in this grey zone. However, members of such groups are not immune from prosecutions for war crimes and other international crimes. There area few ways to address possible crimes perpetrated by such groups, including prosecuting individuals for the commission of international crimes and/or designating the Group as a TCO or terrorist organisation.
The International Code of Conduct
The International Code of Conduct requires that Personnel of Member and Affiliate companies take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and if force is used, it should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation. (Rules for the Use of Force: paragraph 29, Use of Force: paragraph 30-32)
Additionally, security personnel are only allowed to apprehend persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence following an attack or crime against Company Personnel, clients, or property under their protection. Apprehension and detention must be consistent with international and national law, and all apprehended and detained persons must be treated humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law. (Detention: paragraph 33)
Under the International Code of Conduct companies cannot allow their personnel to engage in or benefit from sexual exploitation, abuse, or gender-based violence or crimes. Security companies must require their personnel to remain vigilant for all instances of sexual or gender-based violence, and report these instances to competent authorities. (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) or Gender-Based Violence (GBV): paragraph 38)
The Code requires stringent selection and vetting of personnel, assessment of performance and duties (paragraphs 45 to 49), and training of personnel of the Code and relevant international law, including human rights and international criminal law (paragraph 55).
The Code also requires that incident reports are to be made for any incident involving its personnel and the use of weapons, criminal acts, injury to persons, etc. (paragraph 63). It also mandates the establishment of a Grievance, Whistleblowing and related procedures to address claims brought by personnel or of third parties regarding the failure of the Company to respect the principles mentioned in the Code (paragraph 66-67).
Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
The US Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on eight individuals and entities that it believes are responsible for expanding Russia’s influence in CAR. The EU has also sanctioned individuals that it believes to be involved in the Wagner Group’s activities. In 2021, the EU said that it would no longer train CAR soldiers due to their links to the Wagner Group. In April 2022, the Human Rights Watch wrote to the Russian foreign minister and the government of CAR seeking information on the presence of Wagner Group in the country and the status of forces agreement between Russia and CAR.
Following the death of its two main leaders, Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin in 2023, the Group has morphed into a new entity named Africa Corps led by Wagner veteran Anton Yelizarov. Although its affiliations to Russia was ambiguous under the former guise of Wagner, Africa Corps has been clearly presented as a subsidiary paramilitary organisation of the Russian Federation under the pretence of defending its people and its interest. Russia’s direct involvement in the Africa Corps operations could be an attempt to avoid allowing the Group to grow in autonomy and power and challenge the Russian authorities again, as it did during Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023. Africa Corps also drives Russia’s foreign policy, meaning the advancement of the country’s military strategy in the African continent. Moreover, experts say that because Africa Corps report to Russia’s Defence Ministry, there exists a possibility for them to be held accountable by Russia for violations perpetrated by troops during military operations.
Discussion
What is the definition of a PMSC? Of a PSC? Does the Wagner group meet this definition? Does the Group under its new name of “Africa Corps” meet this definition?
Do the military advisors employed by Wagner qualify as mercenaries under international law?
How can members of private security companies can be held accountable for their alleged crimes?
What are the implications when a private security company is contracted to work in a volatile and complex environment like CAR?
Discuss the importance of conducting human rights due diligence when outside contractors are introduced to a complex conflict-ridden setting.
GGM Concession – With kind permission AngloGold AshantiGeita in Tanzania – With kind permission AngloGold Ashanti
The Geita Gold Mine (GGM) is situated in the Lake Victoria goldfields of Tanzania, about 120km from Mwanza City and 4km west of the township of Geita. The Geita population is approximately 1.7 million people with varying economic activities including small scale and artisanal mining works, animal husbandry and subsistence farming. GGM is one of the most significant gold mining operations in East Africa. The concession is 196.27 km2, including dense forest and hills. It has been in operation as a large-scale mine since 2000 but mining has taken place in the area since the 1930s. In 1999, Ashanti Goldfields Company Limited acquired the mine, and in 2004, the South African-based AngloGold Limited took over Ashanti, creating AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), which subsequently assumed control of GGM. The mine has since become a crucial player in Tanzania’s mining sector, contributing significantly to the country’s gold production. The mine employs around 6,800 people, including contractors, which includes the private security contingent. About 90% of those employed by the mine are from the local community.
GGM is an open-pit and underground mining operation, extracting gold from a range of ore bodies. The mine has consistently demonstrated impressive production levels, making it a vital economic asset for Tanzania.
Security at GGM is of paramount importance due to the high value of the precious metal being extracted. The concession covers a huge area, with villages inside and on the periphery. Approximately 75% of the mine lease falls within the Geita forest reserve which is typically dominated by Miombo woodland. There is no physical barrier at the mine’s boundary.
Relations with the local community have not always been easy. Security pre-2014 was conducted in a typical, traditional arrangement relying heavily on the police and on the use of force or threat thereof for both deterrence and enforcement. Incursions were frequent and serious incidents reportedly commonplace.
Since 2014, the mine has implemented an innovative, comprehensive and integrated security arrangement to safeguard its personnel, assets, and the extracted gold in the form of a much-neededrevised strategy called the “Five Point Plan – Community Enhanced Security”, which in summary is based on:
Removing people from risk and risk from people, to reduce the potential for conflict.
Defining the role of communities in complementing security initiatives.
Defining the role of private and public security in supporting the community enhanced security approach.
Use of trained, skilled and equipped rapid reaction teams to improve response and handling of incidents.
Technology versus manpower optimisation – increased use of appropriate technologies to reduce risk and improve efficiencies.
These arrangements include a combination of virtual perimeter protection, physical security measures, advanced surveillance systems, well-trained contracted private and internal security personnel and the police. In addition, since 2017, community members have been recruited from both within the concession and surrounding area who are employed in “community policing” roles. Restricted access zones are established to control entry to critical areas, and modern surveillance technologies, such as thermal CCTV cameras and sensors, are strategically deployed throughout the site and at the perimeter to monitor activities in real-time from within a centralized Security control centre, enabling a coordinated response against detected threats.
To ensure the safety of the workforce, the Geita Gold Mine has implemented stringent safety protocols and emergency response plans. Regular simulations and training sessions are conducted to prepare personnel for various scenarios, including accidents and potential security threats.
In addition to its economic contributions, the Geita Gold Mine has also played a role in community development initiatives. The mine invests in education, healthcare, and infrastructure projects in the surrounding communities, contributing to the overall well-being of the region. Along with the integrated security arrangements, these development initiatives have contributed to improving community relations.
With a robust and innovative security apparatus in place that includes both a community policing arrangement and responsible private security provision at its heart, the mine not only ensures the protection of its valuable resources but also fosters a safe and thriving environment for its workforce and neighbouring communities.
The Security Environment: From Conflict To Community Involvement
Safety issues at rock pile (with kind permission AngloGold Ashanti)Crowds picking from discarded rock pile (with kind permission AngloGold Ashanti)
Security at GGM had major challenges in the past, with high rates of incursions and incidents, pit invasions, theft and collusion. As a result there were increases in injuries to security staff and third party injuries and fatalities. The general breakdown in community relations also led to disruptions for the business operations. These issues continued apace between 2010 and 2015, with incursions peaking at 15,000 on one particular week in 2015.
Artisanal and community mining occurs in the surrounding area. The population of Geita has grown significantly over the last twenty years, with hundreds of thousands of people attracted to the area by the lure of gold. There are 2 community mining areas within the concession, which are active. Rather than attempting to shut these areas down, AGA co-exists with these communities. The concession is also a protected forest land. Animal husbandry and herding are prevalent in the area. This can also be a source of conflict as herders illegally pass through the concession and through the protected forest area.
Pre-2014, use of force or threat thereof was used as the primary tool to combat incursions at the site. It became clear, however, that this was not an effective strategy and instead was exacerbating an already challenging relationship with the surrounding community.
As illustrated in the graph below, there has been significant reduction in incursions onto the concession over the last decade as a result of the “Five Point Plan – Community Enhanced Security” implementation.
Intrusions at Geita Gold Mine 2014-2023, with kind permission Anglo-Gold Ashanti
As a Member of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Initiative (VPSHR) AGA reports security incidents on an annual basis. Data for 2021 and 2022 for its African based mines, including Geita are below.
Fatalities and injuries, related to interventions by security personnel, at AngloGold Ashanti operations in 2022 and 2021 – VPSHR plenary report
Seven Secrets of Success
Many factors have contributed to a more harmonious relationship between the mine and the surrounding community. The innovative security arrangement has undoubtedly been key, combined with equitable community development programmes. Seven factors, outlined in more detail below, have been critical. The first five are the components that make up the integrated security arrangement at the site. The last two relate to the broader corporate culture of AGA at GGM.
AGA’s Global Head of Security has played an instrumental role in directing GGM’s security team. As part of the company’s Sustainability Leadership Team, working across sustainability functions has given him an appreciation for the important role deep community engagement can and should play in the organisation’s day-to-day operations. This is no doubt one of the reasons that the security team at GGM does not work in isolation but collaborates across functions to ensure the safety of all people (internal and external).
The GGM security team, nearly all Tanzanians and some local, have the local knowledge and hands on experience needed to pilot test and scale-up what some may consider to be an unorthodox, integrated security arrangement. The Senior Security Manager at the mine is a local hire from the Mara community but lived in Geita since school age and has come through the ranks in the company, having started out as a security guard. He is both very experienced and exceptionally capable.
He experienced first-hand the shortcomings of traditional security approaches where use of force and deterrence through use of force display were the primary tools used. Indeed, the first quick win at the site, according to him, was to cease the use of live ammunition by all security service providers on site (private and public) and enforce adherence to the use of force continuum. All security personnel working at the concession must undergo mandatory human rights and Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) training. This requirement to embed human rights training in the security operation, made by AGA, has had significant positive impacts.
In 2016, GGM’s Senior Security Manager, under the guidance and direction of AGA’s Global Head of Security, pilot-tested a community policing model. Once its success was clear, the programme was scaled up across the site. The Senior Security Manager has fully embraced the community policing model, stating that the emphasis of the programme is not about combatting criminals, but rather to share the benefits of GGM more equitably within the community: “Everyone needs to benefit from the fruits of GGM”. The Security Manager has taken direction from the company’s top level, operationalised and tailored it to the local context.
Security at GGM is integrated into every decision, with the Senior Security Manager a trusted member of the site senior management team who is regularly consulted for advice on social and security issues and before any project is developed. Security is thus integrated into every project plan, introduced and enforced as a “shared accountability” concept into day-to-day operational processes. This ensures that security does not become and afterthought.
Similarly, the head of the community policing unit at GGM is a member of the senior in-house security team. An ex-police officer, he has integrated himself within the communities where the project is operating, being both known and respected by them. He is involved throughout the recruitment and training process and sits on the project’s steering committee. Having made the transition from the public police force into GGM’s in-house security team, he is also known and respected by the police, who have ultimate responsibility and command over the programme.
In-house security comprises of 195 staff at full complement. Security provision is included both in the open-pits and underground. There is a special in-house division within the internal security department that provides specialised underground security. Shift coordinators are in charge of operations in the field.
In the video below, GGM’s Senior Security Manager shares insights on:
The history of security at GGM;
The company’s evolving approach to security at the site, including the development of a community policing programme as one critical element in an integrated approach;
Enable senior security personnel to benefit from broader community relations experience within the organisation.
Promote experienced local talent into senior security positions. This helps ensure security arrangements are appropriately adapted to local contexts and builds trust with local communities.
Recruit capable candidates from the public police force assists in building bridges to public security forces.
2. Private Security: Contracting a Responsible Provider
GGM contracted SGA Security, an ICoCA Certified company in 2018. There are other sub-contracted private security companies operating around the site whose contracts are not directly with GGM. The main sub-contracted company is GardaWorld, another ICoCA Certified company, which provides security for the contractor drilling company. SGA Security has 700 personnel at GGM when at full complement. Guards are split between non-armed and those with less-lethal weaponry (no live-ammunition).
SGA Security – The View From The C-Suite
SGA Security took over the contract at GGM in 2018. SGA Security’s management knew that this would be a challenging contract given the problematic history of the mine. Intrusions have reduced by more than 80% since they took over the contract and SGA have been a key-contributor. One the secrets of success from the Managing Director’s perspective is that prior to their deployment, SGA staff are trained up on respect for human rights. Refresher training on these issues takes place on a daily basis (see video interview below with Edward Diswas). Stakeholder engagement between all four actors that make up the security arrangement (in-house security, private security, police, community policing) has also been a key factor accounting for success at the site. Private security, along with community police, make up the largest contingent. Their integration and partnership with GGM’s own in-house security team and the police results in a well-coordinated approach, with the private security provider.
Incident management and monitoring and evaluation of performance has been critical. SGA Security uses “penetration tests”, i.e. intentionally creating a situation without the staff they are testing knowing they are being tested, in order to see how staff respond and react. By monitoring staff’s reaction under these controlled conditions, they are able to learn lessons that are shared with the member(s) of staff who was monitored along with the broader guard-force. To test minimum use of force, for example, they may send someone to aggravate guards to see how they react, and monitor and record their reaction. To test collusion, they may plant some product, (e.g. gold, or gold rocks) and test guards on access control to see if they confiscate the product or collude with the person who is smuggling it out. Controls like this are then used as learning scenarios for the rest of the guard-force.
Rapid response units are key in bringing in the police, when required. The use of force continuum applies to these different actors, with the police being the highest authority to use reasonable force.
SGA have developed their own training as there is no national standard training for private security. In terms of the human rights elements of this training, the company integrates much of the content from the online trainings provided by ICoCA and AGA into their own in-person trainings, and all of the company’s senior management enrol themselves and complete the courses directly.
In the video below, Eric Sambu, Managing Director of SGA Security, Tanzania, shares his insights on:
SGA Security, why the company joined ICoCA, the impact this has had for the company;
How the company approaches its commitment to international standards in private security practices;
How the company has approached the contract with AGA at GGM and the policies, processes and practices they have in place to institutionalise responsible security practices at the mine.
SGA Security – HR Challenges When Operating a Remote Site
SGA Security have developed a sophisticated HR function that is set-up and overseen from Dar es Salaam but managed locally from Geita. The company’s senior management take frequent trips to the mine site for regular meetings with the site manager and to hear complaints against the company.
Recruitment – Announcements are placed in the local media to raise awareness about the opportunities with people living in the area. Candidates are first and foremost recruited from the reserve force (national service – JKU). From this, they look at other minimum criteria such as their level of education and age. At GGM, they are required to recruit from the Geita community, the same community where the assignment will be. GGM have also requested that SGA Security prioritise recruitment from the growing pool of community police. This makes the community policing roles more attractive, given the further career opportunities these positions can potentially open. SGA Security involve all relevant stakeholders, for example the regional security team of the national reserve force are consulted to verify certificates of candidates. There is a belief that human rights starts from the recruitment process: “It is the right to be given the opportunity of a decent livelihood”. Whoever is selected is on merit, whoever is left out it is because they did not have the required qualifications. A minimum quality standard is maintained by the regional HR team as well as by the HR manager who travels to the region to oversee the recruitment process. Regular check-ins are conducted by all members of the management team – pre-recruitment, during recruitment and post recruitment.
Vetting – Candidates are subject to background checks. This includes attaining references from previous employers, the regional security team of the reserve force, etc. There is also a forensic check conducted in cooperation with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the police, to ensure they have no criminal history or other red flags in their history. Once internal and external processes are completed an offer is extended to the candidate.
Training – Along with the training that they have received through the JKU programme (either 9 months or 6 months training), guards then conduct a two-week training. As mentioned above, ICoCA’s human rights training has been incorporated into SGA Security’s training courses and training manuals. Ebenezer states that “ICoCA has been a great partner. The support we have received has completely shaped the management team and our operations. Today ask any guard, what are human rights, and I assure you you’ll be surprised by the answers you get”.(see interview below with Edward Diswas).
Career Progression – SGA Security has put in place career progression plans for security guards. For example, internal candidates are offered opportunities for more senior positions. The Security Manager at GGM is a good example of someone whose career has progressed within the company. He was a guard only five years ago when he joined the company. He was promoted into a managerial position after only a few years as a guard and is now in charge of approximately 600 staff.
Working at a remote site presents some unique challenges for guards which have been addressed by SGA Security as follows:
As the site is includes remote posts accessing the site is challenging – SGA Security organises and provides coordinated transportation to the site
Due to the remote locations of posts, food can be difficult to access – Meals are provided by SGA Security as personnel arrive at work.
Salary payments can sometimes be challenging due to glitches in online banking systems – SGA Security has worked with the banks to iron out problems with the salary payments system.
In most cases minimum wage is not enough to sustain guards – SGA Security pays its guards above minimum wage.
In the video below, Ebenezer Kaale, HR Manager at SGA Security, shares insights on how SGA Security approaches setting up a large security operation at a new remote location such as GGM.
In the video below Dickson Webi and one of the female security officers discuss SGA Security’s arrangement at GGM, covering:
The interaction between SGA Security, the community policing programme, GGM in-house security and the police;
SGA’s recruitment requirements, which include proof of completion of military training with JKT (9-month training) or Mgambo (6-month training), a high school education and a minimum age of 21;
Career progression;
Treatment and training of personnel.
Dickson Webi is an engineering graduate. Of the 700 SGA Security guards at GGM, 169 are university graduates. Working for SGA Security, a responsible private security provider who pays it’s staff a fair wage, a job with SGA Security also presents real career opportunities. As a private security guard at GGM, they are able to earn a better salary than many other professions. In five years with SGA, Dickson has gone from being a security officer to managing a site of 700 people.
Dickson Webi, Site Security Manager Geita Gold Mine, SGA Security
In the video below, Edward Dismas, a Security Officer at SGA security describes the human rights frameworks on which he has been trained and the impact of this training.
Interview with Edward Dismas, Security Officer, Geita Gold Mine, SGA Security
Recommendations
Contract ICoCA Certified companies. This demonstrates implementation of VPSHR and ensures responsible private security provision, with committed management and a well trained and fairly treated workforce fully versed on human rights and international humanitarian law.
Recruit locally. This provides career opportunities for the local community, further strengthening relations between the client and the community where they operate and contributing to the social license to operate.
Integrate the private security provider, ideally an ICoCA certified member, into all the security arrangements. This has positive impacts on the other security actors with best-practice replicated and knowledge passed along the chain.
Maximise the responsibilities of responsible security providers, for example allow them to carry non-lethal firearms as these can be an important deterrent that allows them to avoid calling in the police.
3. The Police – Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
The police role at GGM is minimised, as evidenced by their lower numbers. They are called on for duties the other security functions (in-house security, private security contractor, community police) are not permitted to carry out, most notably bullion protection/escort/transport, arrest, detention and to deal with dangerous situations where maximum force may be required. There are between 40-80 police officers assigned to the site at any one time, depending on the operating environment. The police reside at a camp inside the concession. The number changes depending on requirements at a given time. A blend of police and private security occurs when the private security providers are patrolling the site. Police are utilised in more high-risk operations, such as where the product is stored and when conducting a bullion shipment. The Police carry AK-47s, however in-house security are not permitted to carry these firearms. Police officers with lethal weapons must also be deployed with one carrying non-lethal weapons, such as rubber bullets and tear gas. This way, the police are able to implement a use of force continuum, gradually escalating their response to intruders if required, rather than responding immediately with live ammunition. Police would take over if there are incidents of community unrest, however this has not happened in recent years since the community policing programme was instituted.
All police employed on the site must be trained on the use of force and human rights (VPSHR). They serve for 2 week rotations at the site.
The police are also closely involved in the vetting of private security personnel. Police vetting includes determining any past criminal record or other red flags.
The police are also ultimately responsible for community police officers, including the training of community police.
ICoCA personnel meeting with Geita Police
Recommendations
Recognise the resource constraints public police are often operating within and focus their engagement on those tasks that other security actors are not permitted to conduct.
Reserve police as the last line of defence, however ensure that they carry non-lethal firearms and are thus able to follow a use-of-force continuum always utilising the minimum use of force required for a given situation.
Recognise the critical role the police play by integrating them into the broader security arrangement and involve them in training.
4. Community Police – Integral to Security & Community Relations
Pilot Programme & Structure
Reviewing Successful Candidate Lists for New Intake of Community Police Officers
Between 2015-16, a community policing pilot project was started in 2 locations where 60-70% of incursions were originating. There were three main motivations for initiating the programme:
To address criminal activity including incursions around the site;
To address crime and social ills within the community;
To provide employment opportunities for surrounding communities;
To address limited resources and lack of capacity of police and to support the police – support building capacity for local law enforcement.
The pilot project at Nyakablae village, a community living inside the concession with illegal GBM processing that accounted for 60% of the illegal incursions at that time. The pilot programme ran from 2015/16 to 2020. This four-year period allowed enough time to study the impacts and gaps of the programme, allowing the team time to iterate and test adaptations to the approach. The first round of recruits included 131 community police, who were trained by a range of stakeholders including the police and immigration officers, as there are also issues of illegal migration from neighbouring countries.
The community policing arrangement involves community ‘police’ being recruited every twelve months through community street committees, along with involvement from the security and the corporate social responsibility teams. Street committees are made up of democratically elected representatives of the community. The duty of each street committee is to ensure they are protecting the benefits of GGM for the community they represent. There are two sub-committees for every street committee: a development committee and a security and defence committee. GGM makes a financial contribution to the street committees, with a portion used to pay the community ‘police’ through the security and defence committee, and the remainder is allocated to fund community development programmes as determined by the development committees. While a steering committee oversees the community policing team, the Tanzanian Police Force retains ultimate control. GGM have an MoU with the Tanzanian Police Force in this regard.
Community police are recruited for a twelve month period only. This annually rotating position is a crucial element of the arrangement. In contrast, some other mines in Tanzania have adopted a community policing programme, where community police are recruited for much longer periods, even up to ten years. However, this prolonged tenure can lead to corruption and collusion, causing tensions within the community between those who have a job and those who don’t. A clearly defined 12-month contract, with no expectation of continuation, helps avoid the pitfalls of community capture and prevents the exacerbation of tensions that can occur from people protecting these highly sought-after positions.
Candidates for the programme must fit the following criteria:
Must be a permanent resident for not less than five years;
Must be physically and mentally fit.
Must be above 18 years and below 45 years or 45 years old.
GGM provide training on the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights as well as training on safety.
Role of Community Police
ICoCA Staff Meeting with Community Police & SGA Security at GGM Tailings Dam
Community police act as a first line of defence acting as watchmen and women stationed in non-active areas within the concession and along the mine’s boundary to monitor and warn anyone who strays onto the concession or near the active mine site – they do not, however, actively engage intruders. In the event of intruders, community police inform the security control centre, as there are strategically positioned CCTV at regular intervals around the concession, the control centre initiate the required response teams. They share information on the number of intruders, the location of their entry, etc. This information is then handled by Geita’s in-house security who will take the next appropriate action.
They also act as guardians of the Geita forest reserve conducting forest patrol, ensuring there is no illegal activity within the forest area. Community police also serve as information gatherers within the community, to assist the police in maintaining law and order.
They wear green overalls for a uniform and use personal protection equipment (PPE) if posted in an area requiring it. They are unarmed and carry no weapons. One potential advantage of using community police is that aggression is less likely with intruders who come from the surrounding areas as community police are themselves also members of the surrounding community.
Community police collaborate with the private security provider. At the time of documenting this case, the provider was SGA Security, an ICoCA Certified company.
Impact of Programme
The results of the community policing pilot programme are clear. Not only did incursions drop significantly during the pilot phase, but crimes in the community, including rape and burglary, also went down. Thanks to this, the community saw the benefits of the initiative and supported it. The community policing programme has since been rolled out to 15 communities in the surrounding area, currently employing a total of 957 individuals as community police in and around the concession. The biggest challenge for community police is the vast size of the area they are expected to patrol, but they receive assistance from SGA security patrols.
As the Senior Security Manager at GGM states, “You can’t take security away from community. You need the community to feel part of the business…the community policing programme has provided GGM with the social license to operate”. The 2030 aspiration for the security division at GGM is for “embedded community-enhanced security”. The community policing programme also opens up other opportunities for trained community members. Some community police are recruited by private security companies, others go on to apply for positions in the public police force, while others are engaged by local authorities. SGA Security, GGM’s security provider at the time this report was written, confirmed that they give priority to those who have been through the community policing programme. As GGM’s Senior Security Manager stated, “the Community Policing Programme gives kids a taste of the workplace, it’s important in helping to shape their lives. […] When community members see the impact of community police on their family, everybody wants to be part of it”. The police also confirmed that the community policing programme gives people skills and a work ethic that sets them up for future opportunities. Salaries received by community police have been used by some to provide seed funding to start their own enterprises, including female recruits. Of the initial batch of 120 community police, within one year after their assignments were over, 85 had been recruited into the private security sector.
The community policing programme is one of the main reasons why the requirement for use of force has declined significantly, there is now relative peace and security in the area. This is largely thanks to the mutual understanding that has developed between GGM and the surrounding community due to the sense of ownership the community policy programme has imbued.
Areas for Improvement
There are always areas for improvement. One area could involve increasing the salaries of community police officers. This would be particularly impactful as pertains female community police officers, as women tend to both bring back a larger percentage of their salary than men to the home and use their income to provide the financial resources required to establish small or medium-sized enterprises. Another area would be to create more career opportunities for former community police officers, whether within the private security sector, the police force, other local government positions, or even within GGM.
In the video below, Mihinzo E Tumbo, GGML’s Security Superintendent, shares his insights on the community policing program, which he manages.
Mihinzo E Tumbo, Superintendent Community Policing, GGML
Pilot incorporation of community into the security arrangements, allow time to iterate and learn lessons before scaling up.
Empower existing community governance structures by embedding community policing and link it to community development.
Promote community security to serve a dual purpose of improving security for the community as much as for the company.
5. Use of Technology – Security Without Borders
Technology is extensively used in the security and safety components of operations at GGM. In total, there are 445 CCTV cameras. CCTV uses high-end thermal cameras with impressive range and night-sensitivity, for example the range of the CCTV towers is up to 10km. This reduces the burden on patrols as CCTV towers are placed at regular intervals on the boundary of the site to enable wide area surveillance and pro-active detection of threats. Surveillance cameras are also used in all vehicles and bodycams are being introduced to aid investigations in response to potential allegations of human rights abuse by security guards.
While there is no physical border, no wall or fence, the CCTV towers along with beacons and painted boulders placed every 500 meters in forest areas and every 200 meters in populated areas, essentially act as boundary markers (agreed with communities), making it clear to anyone approaching the concession where the mine’s premises begin. In areas where there are ASM activities, GGM has also introduced roads alongside the concession to show the boundary. The positioning and painting of the boulders themselves, was the result of a community engagement project, conducted in 2012 to raise awareness and agreement with the community on the concession boundary. At that time, AGA made a deliberate decision not to construct a boundary (wall/fence) as the company management believed this would contribute to a sense of division between the mine and the surrounding community, creating a sense of us vs them. The lack of a physical boundary has contributed to the improved relationship and sense of trust between the community and the company. This process also fed into the community policing programme, as community police are able to report intrusions by logging incidents . The emphasis is on using technology to improve efficiency, reduce human intervention and ultimately to reduce the risk of collusion, which now is the greatest challenge the mine faces given the significant improvements in community relations.
Use of Technology at GGM (by kind permission AngloGold Ashanti)
Recommendations
Leverage technology to compliment physical security arrangements, CCTV and other tools can replace the need for barriers.
Use technology responsibly, including to build accountability of the security guard force, for example through deployment of body cams.
Ensure the surrounding community are engaged and understand how technology tools are being deployed around the site.
6. CSR – Investment in the Community
GGML’s CSR initiatives strive to benefit society and the environment as entrenched in the company’s values, which include transforming communities into self-driven sustainable development. The ethos of the CSR programme is that the mine’s presence benefits the surrounding communities.
The mine has been implementing CSR projects since its inception in 2000 and has spent over 100 billion Tsh (approx. $39 million) in the areas of Art and Culture, Social Economic Development, Infrastructure, Education, Health, Environment and Small and Medium Enterprise development. In 2017, the government of Tanzania introduced the CSR law under the regulation of the Mining Act 2010, Miscellaneous Amendments 2017, Section 105. In 2023, the government of Tanzania further released a CSR guideline for the purpose of regulating the CSR activities in line with the Mining Act. Since 2018, the mine has invested more than 55 billion Tsh (approx. $21 million) towards community development.
More than 1300 projects have been implemented between 2018-2023 including full construction and refurbishment of schools, construction of health facilities, income generating projects, youth, sports and culture to name a few. Prior to 2018, the mine constructed and launched the Nyankumbu Girls Secondary School, the Magogo Project Empowerment for Women and Youth, renovation of the Geita referral hospital, construction of the community radio station and the Nyakabale police station and renovated the Geita Prison. The mine also constructed the Moyo wa Huruma Orphanage Centre which continues to receive support from the mine to date. A note worthy project was also the Geita water project which, to date, continues to provide water access to communities.
EDUCATION
Primary school in Katoma in Geita District (by kind permission, AngloGold Ashanti)
Since 2000 and as part of the CSR law introduced in 2017, 1220 education related infrastructure projects in both primary and high schools have been completed. This includes roofing, full construction of schools, additional classrooms, construction of staff houses, ablution facilities, dining halls and over. Furthermore, over 18,000 school chairs and desks and 700 dormitories double-deckers have been manufactured and distributed to schools in Geita Town and Geita District Councils.
Nyankumbu Girls Secondary School (by kind permission AngloGold Ashanti)
The construction of the Nyankumbu Girls Secondary School remains one of Geita’s key legacy projects. The school was built and launched in 2014 with various support and upgrades taking place to date costing 15 billion Tsh (approx. $5 million). The construction activities included 21 classrooms, modern residential housing for 38 families, a multipurpose hall, nine dormitories, three laboratories and associated equipment, a computer lab, home economics building, a library, six sports fields and three ablution blocks, The school enrols 1100 learners and has become a prestigious school in Geita Town due to its good learning environment and performance.
HEALTH
Nyamalembo dispensary covering the OPD building, staff house and ablution facilities (by kind permission AngloGold Ashanti)
In promoting and supporting access to quality health care, over 150 health related projects have been implemented. This includes the renovation of health facilities, construction of dispensaries and OPD buildings, roofing and completion of projects initiated by community efforts, staff houses, reproductive Child Health Care facilities, patients ward as well as the purchase of medical equipment for the various health facilities. Support was also provided towards the purchase of ambulances and support for people living with communicable diseases.
GGML has implemented various income generating projects to promote economic development and alternative livelihoods. The mine launched the rice farming project in Saragulwa Village and constructed sunflower oil production factories in Kasota, Bulela and Bunegezi and distributed sunflower seeds to 7000 farmers (of which 1967 of them are women). The construction of Geita Main market frames, which act as an economic hub, commenced with the first two of three phases completed.
Over the past and in recent years, GGML has contributed towards the construction and refurbishment of public road infrastructure that allows for improved transportation for people, improved accessibility and ultimately, economic growth. This support was shown through the construction of tarmac roads (Sirro barracks, Katundu market and the Regional Office tarmac roads) along with the installation of Solar powered streetlights in Geita town. The mine also completed the construction of the Nyawilimilwa and Nyakaduha box culverts, alongside the refurbishment of the Geita Bukoli road and the initiation of tarmac road construction connecting to the main Geita-Mwanza Road. Improvements were also made to the Katoro cattle auction access road and the construction of the Nyakabale bridge to further support community mobility and access.
7. Corporate Culture – Values-Based Alignment
AGA is a values-based company, with respect for safety being the first value, requiring the utmost respect for human rights and collaboration amongst all stakeholders.
AngloGold Ashanti Values – with kind permission AngloGold Ashanti
AGA has five key strategic focus areas, the first of which is to prioritise people, health, safety and sustainability. According to AGA, “this focus area is the foundation of our business and strategy, ensuring alignment between our values and corporate citizenship responsibilities on the one hand and the business’s long-term growth, sustainability and profitability on the other”. AGA’s values and its strategic prioritisation of people, health, safety and sustainability are evident on notice boards across the site and in conversations with staff.
A noticeboard in the GGM offices
The business model AGA has developed to execute on its strategic plan includes six focal areas. Three of these are closely linked to AGA’s values and are evident in the integrated security arrangement at GGM. This corporate culture is also apparent in the selection of the private security provider, SGA Security. As an ICoCA Certified Member company, SGA Security are not the cheapest security provider GGM could have selected. GGM, however, has made the decision to invest in a security provider that holds the same values as the company, including paying a fair salary, properly vetting and training their staff, respecting human rights and providing a professional work environment that offers opportunities for progression. SGA Security pays above minimum wage, a job in the company at GGM is a sought after position. What SGA Security and AGA clearly understand is that a happy, healthy security guard, paid a fair salary and respected by the employer and its client, is much less likely to collude with community members or mine employees to steal company assets. The risk of losing their job is too high.
GGM and SGA Security are investing in human capital by recruiting and promoting highly capable people from the Geita community. This extends to the community policing programme. By providing good career opportunities through these avenues, this investment translates into social capital. The community policing programme is a great example of this. By integrating the community into the security apparatus, GGM have gone beyond building trust with the community, rather integrating community into the business model itself. By engaging in international frameworks including VPSHR and ICoCA, GGM has integrated solid governance frameworks and management systems, including risk management systems, for example by selecting an ICoCA Certified private security company such as SGA security, that has been awarded multiple ISO standards including ISO 18788. Smart use of technology throughout the security arrangement is also optimising efficiencies at the site, enabling rapid response and avoiding escalating, complex situations.
Key elements of AGA’s business model – by kind permission AngloGold Ashanti
Recommendations
Align company values with respect for human rights and responsible security.
Align all elements of the security apparatus with company values.
Select a private security provider that aligns with company values.
Conclusion
The ground-breaking innovative, integrated security arrangement at GGM is an instructive model that other mining sites as well as sites involving access to land and resources more generally, could learn useful lessons from. While ICoCA does not suggest a cookie-cutter approach to solving entrenched security challenges or setting up new security operations, the Geita model nevertheless contains features that could effectively transferred to other contexts. Key elements, in no particular order, include:
a values based approach, led from the top, that has respect for human rights at its core, and extends throughout the company and its value-chains;
demonstrated implementation of this approach in the procurement of responsible private security providers that are Members of ICoCA;
building a business that involves and benefits the community at its core, not only through investments in meaningful CSR programmes, but by integrating community into its broader security apparatus;
having a multi-layered security approach, offering alternative actions and actors for escalation, including along the use of force continuum, many of which can be directly influenced by company corporate culture, including respect for human rights, thus avoiding an over-reliance on public security, who may not be as inclined or as experienced in deploying soft-skills or minimum use of force when dealing with intruders.
a willingness to try unorthodox approaches, throwing out the traditional security playbook, that rejects security as a discrete and limited task, to one that is embedded and integrated into the company operations as a whole and inclusive of the surrounding community at large.
The Medway Secure Training Centre (STC) was set up in 1998 to house children between the ages of 12 to 18 who are serving a custodial sentence or have been remanded into custody by the courts. It is capable of housing 67 children at a time. Right from its establishment in 1998, G4S has been responsible for managing the Centre. From as early as 1999, inspectors reported that the staff lacked the necessary skills, qualifications or experience to work with vulnerable and volatile children. This resulted in them overly relying on the use of restraint.
According to the Guardian, two whistleblowers had claimed in 2003 that inmates at Medway STC were being abused by staff and by the head of G4S children’s services there. Professor John Pitts, an expert in youth crimes and youth justice, had contacted the relevant authorities on behalf of the whistleblowers but received only one brief reply from one of the agencies he had contacted. An article by the Guardian in 2016 revealed how in 2010 a fifteen-year-old girl suffered a miscarriage at Medway without receiving any hospital care. It was only after a week and half that she was taken to a doctor. Thus, there were multiple allegations against the Medway STC prior to 2016.
G4S was also responsible for running some of the other Secure Training Centers (STC) in England. In 2004, the company came under the spotlight after a 15-year-old boy died in a horrific incident at the Rainsbrook STC. Even after multiple other incidents and the loss of contracts for other STCs (like Rainsbrook), in 2015, G4S again won the competition to manage Medway STC for another five years. A 2014 inspection by Ofsted (office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills) had found that the Medway STC was “good with some outstanding features” and reported the Centre to be calm and orderly.
The Incidents
The incidents covered by the 2016 Panorama documentary were secretly filmed in 2015 and included instances like pressure being heavily applied on children’s neck, slapping a teenager several times in the head, using restraint techniques that had been authorized only for grave situations (methods which bodies like the UN Committee Against Torture and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons had recommended to be prohibited), and using foul language and threatening the children by the staff. The documentary also revealed how the staff tried to cover up their behavior by ensuring they were in areas not covered by the CCTV cameras and how G4S misrepresented the incidents to the government to avoid fines.
The use of force against children was prevalent, especially as a response to cases of self-harming by the children. In one particular incident, the staff prevented access to a hospital to one of the children for treatment after self-harm, citing the child’s “challenging behavior” as the reason for the refusal. An Ofsted report stated that about two incidents involving force use occur daily. There were also allegations of strip-searches being conducted on children, at times in the presence of security personnel who were not the same sex as the child in question.
A report, which was released after the allegations, stated that staff were often recruited to the STC even without prior experience with children. Staff behavior revealed that many were unclear and inconsistent in how they should manage the complex behavior of children and teenagers. Ofsted investigations found that staff were often “poorly trained and largely unqualified”.
There was high staff turnover, with 2015 marking a staff turnover of 60%. This high turnover of staff meant that the majority of them were inexperienced, nor did they receive the necessary support or supervision to execute their tasks to a good standard. Many were also promoted internally relatively quickly. Due to staff shortages, at times, children were forced to remain locked in their rooms, missing out on activities they had earned through good behavior. In one of Osfted’s investigations favoritism among staff was pointed out by some of the children. The tendency of staff to “give in to young people’s demands inappropriately because of a prevailing culture which is not strong enough to impose and maintain appropriate boundaries and rules” was pointed out.
Investigations
G4S attempted to stop the broadcast of the footage by BBC by arguing that the filming was unauthorized and illegal. The managing director of G4S children’s services referred the allegations to the Medway Child Protection team and police on 30 December. Following the Panorama program, sixteen people were arrested and seven of the staff members were suspended. The Youth Justice Board stated that it had increased its monitoring of the Centre.
By 2019 of the nine people that the Crown Protection Service (CPS) had decided to prosecute, seven were found not guilty and no verdict had been reached for the other two cases.
The International Code of Conduct
The International Code of Conduct requires that Personnel of Member and Affiliate companies take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and if force is used, it should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation. (Rules on the Use of Force : paragraph 29, Use of Force : paragraph 30-32).
Additionally, security personnel are only allowed to apprehend persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence following an attack or crime against Company Personnel, clients, or property under their protection. Apprehension and detention must be consistent with international and national law, and all apprehended and detained persons must be treated humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law. (Detention: paragraph 33)
The Code instructs Member and Affiliate companies to provide a safe and healthy working environment and to adopt policies that support this. This includes policies that address psychological health, deter workplace violence, alcohol and drug abuse and other improper behavior. Companies must also ensure that reasonable precautions are taken to protect relevant staff in high-risk or life-threatening operations (paragraph 64).
The Code requires stringent selection and vetting of personnel, assessment of performance and duties (paragraphs 45 to 49), and training of personnel of the Code and relevant international law, including human rights and international criminal law (paragraph 55). Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
In 2016, following the BBC’s expose of the abuses at Medway STC, G4S lost the right to manage the Centre. It was then taken over by the government. Even when the STC was placed under government management, Ofsted investigations in 2019 found the quality of practice to have declined and that pain inflicting techniques continued to be used on children. In March 2020, the Medway STC was shut down.
Despite multiple allegations of abuses by G4S personnel in different Secure Training Centers (like in Medway and Rainsbrook), other STCs like the Oakhill STC continue to be run by it. This is despite the allegations raised by a whistleblower in 2021 against serious abuses at the Centre. An inspection of the Centre in 2023 by Ofsted concluded that it requires further improvement to be good.
Discussion
Discuss how this case reveals the importance of training and vetting of personnel when it comes to staff having to work in volatile environments or with ‘special’ groups like children.
Between 1969 and 1991, Somalia was ruled by a socialist military dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre, who seized power in a coup d’état. After years of corruption and economic mismanagement, when Barre’s regime came to an end Somalia was plunged into a prolonged and devastating civil war that had repercussions throughout East Africa. Within this turmoil, different regions of Somalia sought greater independence from Mogadishu: Somaliland declared itself an independent state in the northwest and Puntland claimed autonomy in the northeast.
This region became increasingly lawless, which was exacerbated by the dissolution of the Somali Navy. This vacuum of authority facilitated the intrusion of illegal foreign fishing and waste dumping in Somali territorial waters. This and other factors ultimately led to the emergence of piracy as a widespread problem.
Between approximately 2005 and 2012, Puntland was a thriving hub of piracy operations around the Gulf of Aden. To combat it, the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) was established in 2011. Sterling Corporate Services, a Dubai-based company, was contracted to create and train this force. The company was accused of violating the arms embargo imposed on Somalia.
Initially, a private military company called Saracen International was contracted by the Puntland government to train the PMPF. The PMPF project was funded by the UAE, as the country’s business operations were threatened by Somali pirates. It was later rebranded and a new company, Sterling Corporate Services, was set up in Dubai to oversee the training of the anti-piracy operation. Erik Prince, former head of Blackwater Worldwide, and Michael Shanklin, former CIA station chief in Mogadishu, were also involved in this project. According to a confidential AU report, Erik Prince was “at the top of the Saracen management chain and provided the seed money for the Saracen contract.”Michael Shanklin was an advisor to the then Somali government and helped mediate negotiations between Saracen, the Somali government and the UAE.
The Incidents
International organizations expressed concern about the techniques and approach employed by Sterling Corporate Services in training and working with Somali anti-piracy trainees. They were accused of beating and even killing Somali trainees during training sessions. The UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) found that one of the trainees had been “hogtied with his arms and feet tied behind his back and beaten.” Although the UNO group claimed that the trainee died from the injuries, Sterling Corporate Services denied the allegation. In one of the incidents, one of the South African trainers was shot and killed by a Somali trainee. According to Sterling, this was an isolated incident and the accused trainee was arrested.
In 2012, SEMG stated that Saracen International had neither sought nor obtained authorization from the international body to operate as a private military contractor in Somalia. Saracen’s continued military training and deployment was in defiance of the overall UN arms embargo. That same year, the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries stated that Sterling/Saracen’s operations went beyond training. A Saracen chartered flight, which was grounded by Somaliland authorities, was found to be carrying an unauthorized shipment of combat uniforms, military straps and other materials.
The International Code of Conduct
The International Code of Conduct requires that personnel of member and affiliated companies take all reasonable measures to avoid the use of force, and if force is used, it must be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation. (Standards for the Use of Force: paragraph 29, Use of Force: paragraphs 30-32).
The Code requires rigorous screening and vetting of personnel, assessment of their performance and functions (paragraphs 45-49), and training of personnel on the Code and relevant international law, including human rights and international criminal law (paragraph 55).
The Code also requires the reporting of any incident involving its personnel involving the use of weapons, criminal acts, injury to persons, etc. (paragraph 63). It also requires the establishment of a grievance, whistleblowing and related procedures to deal with complaints lodged by staff or third parties in relation to the company’s failure to comply with the principles mentioned in the Code (paragraph 66-67).
Compliance with the requirements of the Code of Conduct can help private security companies and their clients to ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed and accountable.
In September 2012, Sterling Corporate Services lost the contract to train Puntland’s paramilitary maritime police force to fight piracy, amid criticism from the UN’s Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG). There were concerns that Sterling Corporate Services was leaving an unpaid but well-armed security force in Puntland, and that this could lead to further destabilization of the area. Bancroft Global Development, a U.S.-based private military security contractor, was asked to assess whether these officers could be assimilated into Somalia’s other security forces, which had both U.S. and African Union approval. Bancroft trained Ugandan and Burundian soldiers for counterinsurgency missions in Somalia under the African Union flag. He stated that he would not take over Sterling’s counter-piracy mission.
Discussion
What are the implications of leaving behind an unpaid force trained in the use of weapons in an already unstable region?
The Abu Ghraib facility is a large prison complex in Baghdad, Iraq. During the regime of Saddam Hussein, it was infamous for the detainment and torture of political prisoners. The prison was reopened in 2003 by the US military after the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies. In 2003, the Associate Press published the first press report focusing on the mistreatment of detainees under U.S. control at the Abu Ghraib facility. By 2004, images of abuse and torture taking place at the facility emerged as part of CBS’s “60 Minutes 2” program, leading to a scandal for the then US President George W. Bush’s administration.
A report from the US army’s internal investigation carried out in 2004 under Army General Antonio Taguba, detail the shocking practices that were followed. One gruesome image that quickly became well publicized was of US Army specialists giving a thumbs-up and posing next to the dead body of Manadel al-Jamadi who was clearly tortured and died of asphyxiation.
CACI International Inc. was a defense contractor hired by the US to provide interrogation services at Abu Ghraib. The company L-3 Services (formerly called Titan Corporation) was the contractor responsible for translation services. They were hired as the US military lacked enough trained interrogators to fully staff the Abu Ghraib facility. The employees and managers of CACI have been accused of directing or/and encouraging torture and of covering it up.
In 2008, four plaintiffs who were formerly detained at Abu Ghraib filed a lawsuit against these defense contractors for their complicity in torture. In November 2024 US jury found CACI liable for abusing the prisoners.
The Incidents
Detainees were physically and sexually abused, inflicted electric abuse and mock executions. The report by Taguba include incidents of rape, photographing and videotaping nudes of male and female detainees, use of extreme force against them and more. Torture was not limited to just physically but emotionally and psychologically as well. For instance, in one incident a prisoner was coerced into thanking Jesus for his life.
According to one of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit field in 2008, he was subjected to electric shocks, deprivation of food, kept naked, etc. Another plaintiff recounted how he was forcibly subjected to sexual acts and forced to witness the rape of another female prisoner. Other incidents include, sensory deprivation, solitary confinement, assault, being forced to be in stress positions for long periods of time, having their genitals beaten and more.
Legal Aspects
Court Cases
On 9 June 2004, a group of 256 Iraqis, who were former detainees at the Abu Ghraib facility, filed a case against CACI and L-3 Services. The defendant companies argued that the subject matter of the claim constituted a political question and so cannot be decided by the courts. They also claimed their immunity as government contractors. The court dismissed the companies’ motion to dismiss the compliant in June 2006. In September 2009, the courts ruled in favor of the defendant companies. Though the plaintiffs filed a petition for an appeal in April 2010, in June 2011 the US Supreme Court announced that it would not hear an appeal in this case.
On 30 June 2008, four other plaintiffs filed a separate case against CACI International Inc. for directing their torture at Abu Grahib prison. The lawsuit does not allege that CACI employees themselves carried out the abuses but that they instructed the soldiers to ‘soften’ up the detainees, so that they would more easily reveal information, even though CACI knew this ‘softening up’ would lead to torture. In addition to CACI, the lawsuit also filed against L-3 Services Incorporated and against a former employee of CACI, Timothy Dugan.
The plaintiffs are Iraqi civilians who were detained at the Abu Ghraib prison and later released without being charged for any crime. It was filed on the behalf of the plaintiffs by the Center for Constitutional Rights. The case was filed under the 1789 US law Alien Tort Statute (ATS) which can be used to pursue legal claims over alleged human rights abuses and violations of US and international law including torture, assault, sexual assault and battery, negligent hiring and supervision, etc.
CACI has claimed the lawsuit to be baseless. Since the case was first filed in 2008, CACI has attempted 18 times to have the case dismissed. Both L-3 Services and Timothy Dugan were dismissed as defendants in the case in 2008. In 2019, CACI appealed against the 2019 decision of a lower court’s that favored the plaintiffs. In June 2021, US Supreme Court judges declined to hear CACI’s appeal, putting them a step closer to facing a lawsuit by the plaintiffs.
A new trial for this lawsuit was set to begin on April 2024 in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In November 2024, over two decades after the events occurred, a jury awarded $42 million to three former Abu Ghraib detainees after finding CACI liable for collaborating with military police to perpetrate abuse against the prisoners.
The International Code of Conduct
The International Code of Conduct requires that Personnel of Member and Affiliate companies take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and if force is used, it should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation. (Rules for the Use of Force: paragraph 29, Use of Force: paragraph 30-32)
Additionally, security personnel are only allowed to apprehend persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence following an attack or crime against Company Personnel, clients, or property under their protection. Apprehension and detention must be consistent with international and national law, and all apprehended and detained persons must be treated humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law. (Detention: paragraph 33)
Under the International Code of Conduct companies cannot allow their personnel to engage in or benefit from sexual exploitation, abuse, or gender-based violence or crimes. Security companies must require their personnel to remain vigilant for all instances of sexual or gender-based violence, and report these instances to competent authorities. (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) or Gender-Based Violence (GBV): paragraph 38)
Further, the International Code of Conduct requires stringent selection and vetting of personnel, assessment of performance and duties, and training of personnel of the Code and relevant international law, including human rights and international criminal law.
Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
In 2004, in an attempt to undo the damages, the Justice Department stated that it would rewrite its legal advice on how interrogations are to be conducted. The same year, the CIA also stated that it would suspend its use of interrogation techniques at detention facilities until a rule was made on what was permissible. In 2009, torture was banned under the Obama administration. A new legal framework was also created, so that perpetrators could be held liable, irrespective of their status as the employee of a government or military contractor. In 2006, the prison was handed over to Iraqi authorities and in 2014 it was shut down.
A limited settlement was provided by the private security firm responsible for offering translation services to some of the survivors of the abuse at the Abu Ghraib facility. Though 11 soldiers were convicted for their actions, the US military itself has not paid any compensation to any of the detainees.
CACI continues to be a defence contractor for the US government, with the company recently gaining a contract worth 382 million dollars in 2024.
Discussion
Would better training of the employees of CACI in international law and human rights law have had any impact in mitigating the abuse and torture at Abu Ghraib?
In late 2000, the Brazilian government incentivised the development of palm oil in the region of Pará in Brazil. This resulted in a boom in palm oil, which is mainly used in the food and biofuel industries. The lands where the palm oil companies came to occupy, however, were traditionally used by the indigenous communities, who have been living there for centuries. This resulted in a clash between the local indigenous communities and the palm oil companies and has since been dubbed as the ‘Amazonian Palm Oil War’.
In 2020, the company Brasil BioFuels (BBF) acquired Biopalma and became the largest producer of palm oil in Latin America. This takeover by BBF reportedly resulted in an escalation of violence between the company and the indigenous communities. Allegedly, BBF did not honour the previous agreements between Biopalma and the indigenous communities.
BBF and these communities have been clashing over a disputed area in the Acará region. The company has been accused of land-grabbing, water contamination and other environmental crimes. Allegedly, the pesticide used by BBF had contaminated the water used by the Tembé and other indigenous groups. The company has also been accused of conducting violent campaigns to silence the indigenous communities who claim to be defending their ancestral lands.
According to BBF, the company is the victim and it accuses the indigenous communities of attacking its employees and security guards. It denies causing physical harm to the indigenous community members and has stated that its hired security has been instructed to act peacefully, respectfully and in accordance with the current legislation. Since 2021, BBF has filed over 650 police reports against the indigenous community members. The community members have denied these allegations.
On May 14, 2023, a prominent indigenous leader was shot which further fuelled the conflict in this region. It also resulted in the creation of a Crisis Committee to investigate the crime.
The Incidents
Reportedly, on 4 August, 2023, Kauã Tembé a 19-year-old member of the Tembé indigenous community, was allegedly shot in the groin by “heavily armed” security guards of BBF and the military police, an incident which the community leaders described as an “arbitrary action”. On 7 August, three more indigenous people were allegedly shot by the security guards while the indigenous people protested in front of the BBF headquarters over what happened to Kauã Tembé. An indigenous person, Dayane Tembé, was also allegedly shot in the neck by the security guards while she filmed their actions against the indigenous people from inside her vehicle. In total, five indigenous community members were reported to be wounded by the private security guards of BBF between August 4 and August 7, 2023.
BBF has stated that the escalation of the conflict started on 3 August after a specialised military police battalion went to remove the armed invaders threatening and assaulting the company workers. The company reiterated that the land is not demarcated as indigenous land and that the indigenous community members were invading the company’s private property. The company’s private security team had managed to contain the criminal action of the invaders and was safeguarding the lives of the workers who were on site. It also stated that it had taken the appropriate legal measures with the judiciary and has requested support from state security agencies as well.
Legal Aspects
Investigations
On 8 August 2023, the State Department of Public Security and Social Defense (Segup) of Pará stated that the security guard behind Kauã Tembé’s shooting had been detained.
The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) has stated that it has launched an investigation into the activities of the private security companies and armed militia in the region, and the possible crimes and irregularities committed by these companies. MPF has at least three open inquiries into BBF over its alleged crimes including environmental damages and the use of private security guards against the indigenous communities.
In a statement made to the police by one of BBF’s outsourced security guards, the guards alleged that the company asked them to create false narratives of theft and other crimes and to try and incriminate the indigenous community members.
The International Code of Conduct
The International Code of Conduct requires that Personnel of Member and Affiliate companies take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and if force is used, it should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation. (Rules on the Use of Force : paragraph 29, Use of Force : paragraph 30-32).
Additionally, security personnel are only allowed to apprehend persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence following an attack or crime against Company Personnel, clients, or property under their protection. Apprehension and detention must be consistent with international and national law, and all apprehended and detained persons must be treated humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law. (Detention: paragraph 33)
The Code requires stringent selection and vetting of personnel, assessment of performance and duties (paragraphs 45 to 49), and training of personnel of the Code and relevant international law, including human rights and international criminal law (paragraph 55). Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct, can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
Major international brands like Kellogg, Ferrero, Hershey’s, Nestlé, PepsiCo, Unilever and more continue to purchase palm oil from BBF despite the ongoing conflict in this region.
Discussion
What impact can clients have on curtailing the violence in this region between the indigenous community members and the security guards of BBF?
How can the use of excessive force by security guards in fragile contexts like these, where there is a clash between the local communities and large companies like BBF, be prevented?
Del Monte’s pineapple farm in Kenya is the “single largest exporter of Kenyan produce to the world”. Almost all pineapples produced in the Del Monte farm in Kenya are exported abroad, mainly to British supermarkets like Tesco, Waitrose, Asda and Sainbury. In contrast, the local villages surrounding the farm live in poverty, leading to a black-market demand for the fruit in this area. Some villagers, particularly the young men, are accused of trespassing on Del Monte’s farmland to steal the pineapples. Allegedly, these young men often raided the farms on motorcycles leading to clashes between the guards and the villagers over the stolen pineapples, with one security guard losing an eye due to a stone thrown by a thief. The claims suggest that the guards, in return, have been using excessive force while dealing with the villagers.
This Del Monte farm employs 273 security guards. The guards are armed with wooden clubs called “rungus”. Reports suggest that the guards have been assaulting the villagers with rungus causing blunt force trauma, leading to death in some cases. Reports made to the police usually have no follow up, with the police allegedly turning a blind eye to the violence. These security guards have been reportedly accused of five deaths over the last decade but have had no convictions.
The Incidents
The law firm Leigh Day has detailed over 146 alleged incidents in its letter to Del Monte. The joint investigation by the Guardian and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism also uncovered claims from the villagers including eye witness accounts. They also investigated four deaths linked to Del Monte security guards. Incidents of violence include the guards allegedly attacking the passengers of a minibus travelling through the plantation in 2021 September. The bus had broken down on the public roads within the plantation and the passengers were beaten up with rungus.
On December 2022, John Rui Karia was allegedly attacked as he slept by the road side next to the farm. Reportedly, though the guards beat him up badly, he was denied medical care and passed away after a week in prison. The pathologist’s report revealed that he suffered a series of injuries including “multiple contusions of the abdomen, lungs, and brain, and defence injuries to the forearms”.
On July 2023, Del Monte guards were once again accused of reportedly running over and seriously injuring two teenagers for alleged theft. Other accusations include death due to strangulation, blunt force trauma, drowning and more. Victims often had signs of assault and violence. There are reports of serious injuries and beatings and five allegations of rape.
Legal Aspects
Investigations
Though five former guards of Del Monte were fired for their involvement in the death of one of the locals in 2019, their trial has still not taken place. On the other hand, some of the local men who were found guilty of stealing pineapples have been given long prison sentences, with some even sentenced to death.
Kenya’s Human Rights Commission has launched an investigation into these allegations. It has asked Del Monte to take immediate action and to ensure effective remedy and has asked state agencies to “hasten and conduct structured investigations”. It has also asked Del Monte to put measures into place to prevent similar future incidents.
The International Code of Conduct
The International Code of Conduct requires that Personnel of Member and Affiliate companies take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and if force is used, it should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation. (Rules on the Use of Force : paragraph 29, Use of Force : paragraph 30-32).
Additionally, security personnel are only allowed to apprehend persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence following an attack or crime against Company Personnel, clients, or property under their protection. Apprehension and detention must be consistent with international and national law, and all apprehended and detained persons must be treated humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law. (Detention: paragraph 33)
Under the International Code of Conduct companies cannot allow their personnel to engage in or benefit from sexual exploitation, abuse, or gender-based violence or crimes. Security companies must require their personnel to remain vigilant for all instances of sexual or gender-based violence, and report these instances to competent authorities. (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) or Gender-Based Violence (GBV): paragraph 38)
The Code requires stringent selection and vetting of personnel, assessment of performance and duties (paragraphs 45 to 49), and training of personnel of the Code and relevant international law, including human rights and international criminal law (paragraph 55). Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct, can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
In 2019, after one of the locals was allegedly beaten to death by the security guards on the farm, Del Monte improved its security and safety practices. The company updated radio communication, trained guards on new formal rules of engagement and enhanced formal processes around allegations of violence. Still, five of the alleged deaths caused by security guards occurred post 2019.
Del Monte has stated that it views these allegations seriously and has launched a “full and urgent investigation” on them. Companies like Tesco have suspended its orders from Del Monte sourced from this farm until investigations are completed. Waitrose too reiterated that all its suppliers should comply with “strict ethical standards”.
Discussion
How can companies proceed to win back the trust of the local community after violent incidents?
How should the security guards of Del Monte have dealt with the individuals they accuse of trespassing? What kind of measures would have made the guards better equipped to deal with this situation?
How can clients and private security companies prevent sexual abuse and the use of force against vulnerable local villagers?
The Brook House Immigration Centre is a privately managed detention centre in London which houses foreign nationals whose asylum applications have been rejected or those who have served prison sentences. It has a capacity of more than 500 men and has the same security as a category B prison. Category B prisons have the second highest level of security (after category A) and house inmates that do not pose an immediate risk to the public but may still require a higher level of security. At Brooke House, both inmates whose asylum claims have been rejected and those with prison sentences are detained together. Though the Centre was initially designed to hold detainees for less than 72 hours, they end up spending at least three months there on an average.
Brook House was initially managed by the company G4S, ever since it opened up in 2009 under a Home Office contract. Between 2022-2018, G4S reportedly made a gross profit of 12.3 million Euros from running the Centre.
In 2010, a report published by the then Chief Inspector of Prisons Anne Owers stated that Brook House was “one of the least safe immigration detention facilities that had been inspected”. There was a rampant problem of violence, bullying and drugs at the Centre. In 2009, a large number of the staff had resigned following a fire started by detainees. Staff reported feeling unsupported by their managers and often found it difficult to control the behaviour of detainees. This consequently resulted in them utilising higher use of force, separation and isolation methods, and restrictions to control detainees and curb their violent behaviour.
Things came to a head in 2017, when a BBC Panorama Documentary revealed the shocking conditions at Brook House, where detainees were reportedly harshly abused both verbally and physically. BBC obtained secretly filmed footage of the interactions at the Centre with the help of whistle-blower Callum Tulley, who had been working at the Centre since he was 18 years old.
The Incident
The documentary revealed a shocking culture of abuse and silence that existed within Brook House. Accounts of abuse at the Centre include G4S staff bullying and humiliating detainees, and addressing them in degrading language. Incidents include staff taunting a naked detainee, staff trying to “scare/freak out” another detainee who was under suicide watch, and using abusive and depredatory language at the detainees or while referring to them and excusing it as ‘banter’. The Brook House Inquiry report published on 2023 found at least 19 instances of mistreatment at the Centre, which are contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Allegedly, though only a minority of the staff were involved in these patterns of abuse from 2015-2017, the rest of the staff turned a blind eye. There was a culture of silence. Any staff member who showed empathy for the detainees were mocked for it. There was also rising concerns of widespread drug use, bullying and mental health. Incidents of self-harm or threat of self-harm were reportedly very high.
Reportedly, there was a persistent staff shortage problem at the Centre which resulted in heavy workloads for the staff. This meant officers were often overworked, irritable, tired, desensitised and prone to taking out their frustrations on detainees. Callum states how often it was just two officers responsible for a single wing which houses more than 100 detainees. In some cases, officers were injured after being attacked by detainees and had to be taken to the hospital.
Legal Aspects
Court cases
Though no prosecutions were brought about after the police investigation, two former detainees were successful in their attempt to have a full independent investigation. A public inquiry of the conditions at the Centre was ordered. The first phase of public hearing began on 2021. On September 2023 The Brook House Inquiry Report was published with 33 recommendations. The Inquiry Chair has urged the Home Office to respond to the report within six months.
The International Code of Conduct
The International Code of Conduct requires that Personnel of Member and Affiliate companies take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and if force is used, it should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation. (Rules on the Use of Force : paragraph 29, Use of Force : paragraph 30-32).
The Code states that Member and Affiliate Companies will only, and require their personnel to treat all detained persons humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law, including prohibitions on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (paragraph 33).
The Code instructs Member and Affiliate companies to provide a safe and healthy working environment and to adopt policies that support this. This includes policies that address psychological health, deter work-place violence, alcohol and drug abuse and other improper behaviour. Companies must also ensure that reasonable precautions are taken to protect relevant staff in high-risk or life-threatening operations (paragraph 64).
The Code requires stringent selection and vetting of personnel, assessment of performance and duties (paragraphs 45 to 49), and training of personnel of the Code and relevant international law, including human rights and international criminal law (paragraph 55). Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct, can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
A series of investigations was launched following the documentary’s release. Inquiry into the abuse at the detention centre began on 2021. G4S is no longer responsible for the Centre. In 2020, the company Serco took over the Centre. Ten personnel of G4S were dismissed or had to resign due to this controversy.
G4S has also removed itself from the management of another immigration Centre called Tinsley House. By August 2019, it stopped operating accommodation centres for asylum seekers in the Midlands, north-east England and Norther Ireland after it was overlooked in the tendering process.
In 2021 BBC interviewed some of the detainees (current and former) at the Centre again. This time there was no allegations of violence but instead the concern was more on how Covid was handled by the Centre.
Discussion
What reasons could have sustained this culture of abuse at Brook House? If there was sufficient staff to handle the detainees, with reasonable working hours and conditions, would it have made a difference?
The grievance redressal system for the staff at the Centre was clearly lacking. How different would the outcome have been if the managers had addressed staff concern on time?
The Williamson Mine is one of the world’s longest continuous mining operations, beginning in the 1940s under British colonial rule. Petra Diamonds owns the mine through a 75% stake in the local operating company, and the Tanzanian government holds the remaining 25%.
The Williamson Mine is located in a rural area of the Kishapu District of northern Tanzania’s Shinyanga region. Within the eleven neighbouring communities of the mine, there is an estimated population of a little over 30,000 residents.
Small-scale (artisanal) diamond mining in the Shinyanga region has been practised since at least the early twentieth century. Some local residents seek to supplement their incomes by searching for diamonds in the nearby mines. A 2009 World Bank report found that for the “vast majority” of local residents engaged in artisanal mining around the Williamson Mine, it is “a poverty driven coping mechanism undertaken due to the lack of viable alternative livelihood options.”
A 2011 study commissioned by Tanzania’s Ministry of Energy and Minerals found that 86% of employment opportunities for Tanzanians at the Williamson Mine did not go to local people, and those positions tended to involve casual, short-term labour.
Generally, the mineral wealth of the region has made it a target for illegal mining operations. In response, Petra Diamond has asserted that its control of the mine and its diamonds is “non-negotiable – and we will employ all necessary means – over and covert – to protect our diamonds from theft or loss.”
The Williamson Mine employs a Tanzanian private security contractor, Zenith Security Services, to guard the site. The security personnel are deployed with firearms, tear-gas, batons, and other weapons.
The Incident
In November 2020, a UK-based NGO, RAID, reported on various alleged human rights abuses at the Petra Diamonds-owned Williamson diamond mine. Based on field research of the mine, RAID found evidence that since Petra Diamonds acquired the mine, there had allegedly been seven killings, forty-one assaults, detainment and incarceration in poor conditions, deprivation of food and medical treatment, and beatings.
In some incidents, the assaults appeared to amount to torture and/or inhuman and degrading treatment. Some individuals alleged severe beatings, with pain being intentionally inflicted on the detainees. Individuals also alleged the purposeful denial of food, water, medical care, and guards disallowing individuals to get up and move, sometimes even being handcuffed to hospital beds at the medical centre.
After the original report, further research by RAID revealed that security guards allegedly swapped rubber projectiles with metal shot in their weapons to intimidate trespassers, increasing the risk of serious injury or death.
Zenith guards were allegedly directly implicated in nearly all killings and abuses documented; these guards are readily identifiable due to their uniforms and weapons. RAID found only two cases in which security guards were charged or convicted by authorities for human rights abuses. One security guard was sentenced to six months’ conditional discharge for allegedly shooting two local residents detained on the mine site, and the other was allegedly sentenced to two years in prison for killing a local resident.
Some injured detainees were taken to Williamson Diamonds Hospital, the mine-owned and operated medical facility. The interviewed individuals described the hospital staff as ignoring and/or providing substandard care to those brought in by security personnel.
Legal Aspects
Court cases
In May 2020, 32 Tanzanian nationals brought a lawsuit to the London High Court. The number of claimants expanded to 72 in November 2020. Ten of the claims were brought by families of those who are alleged to have been killed at the Williamson Mine. The claimants alleged breaches of human rights, personal injuries, and deaths arising from the mine’s security operations.
The International Code of Conduct
The International Code of Conduct requires that Personnel of Member and Affiliate companies take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and if force is used, it should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation. (Rules for the Use of Force : paragraph 29, Use of Force : paragraph 30-32)
Additionally, security personnel are only allowed to apprehend persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence following an attack or crime against Company Personnel, clients, or property under their protection. Apprehension and detention must be consistent with international and national law, and all apprehended and detained persons must be treated humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law. (Detention: paragraph 33)
Further, the International Code of Conduct requires stringent selection and vetting of personnel, assessment of performance and duties (paragraphs 45 to 49), and training of personnel of the Code and relevant international law, including human rights and international criminal law (paragraph 55). Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct, can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
Impact
Public Relations
After Petra Diamonds settled with the Tanzanian national claimants, the company released a press release to the market. Petra Diamonds stated that it had “acted decisively to hold individuals to account” and that disciplinary action had been taken with several employees having left (or would be leaving) the company. Petra Diamonds said it had appointed a new security contractor, and closed the on-site detention facility.
Petra Diamonds also acknowledged that “past incidents have taken place that regrettably resulted in the loss of life, injury, and mistreatment of illegal diggers.”
Settlements and Fines
In May 2021, Petra Diamonds reached a settlement, not admitting any liability, with the 71 anonymous claimants. Petra Diamonds agreed to pay 4.3 million sterling pounds ($6 million) in the settlement.
The settlement also included the establishment of an “operational grievance mechanism” to track human rights abuses at Williamson Mine, and Petra Diamonds’ involvement in community projects for three years.
The community projects included enhanced community medical support, access to the concession to collect firewood and livestock, and a gender-based violence campaign to provide support and counselling for victims.
As part of the settlement, a substantive framework for the valuation of twenty-five additional claims was agreed to between the parties.
The Companies also agreed to embed a non-harassment and victimisation policy to safeguard victims and human rights defenders against future harm or intimidation.
Discussion
How can private security companies and their personnel avoid conflicts with small-scale miners who might enter a mining client’s land?
What are the challenges of preventing cruel and inhuman treatment in client-owned detention and medical centres, and how can these challenges be addressed?
The North Mara Mine is located in the Tarime district of the Mara region of Tanzania. An indigenous community, the Kurya of North Mara, live in the area of the mine.
Similar to the Porgera mine, both private security forces and Tanzanian police provide security for the mine through successive memorandum of understanding agreements. Under the memorandum of understanding, the North Mara mine provides police with fuel, vehicles, accommodation, and administrative support.
In November 2014, Tanzanian authorities wrote a letter to Barrick Gold calling for “zero intrusions and zero fatalities.” The letter requested that Barrick Gold remove police guards and relinquish certain areas of small-scale mining operations in order to accomplish this goal.
According to interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch, villagers in the area recounted that they had to pay the mine’s private security and police bribes to enter certain areas of the mine. Further, in a 2017 Human Rights report on the mine, the US State Department noted that the “most significant human rights issues” included alleged excess use of force, deprivation of life, and lengthy pretrial detention. Another report in 2017, from Acacia (now owned by Barrick Gold), reported that there had been 7 allegations of excessive use of force by private security during 2016, and 16 allegations of the same nature in 2015.
In August of 2018, MiningWatch noted that there was a decline in security related deaths in and around the mine, which a member of the mine’s Grievance Committee attributed to the new practice of expelling officers implicated in cases of excess use of force.
The Incident
At the North Mara Mine, alleged incidents involving the use of excessive force by police and security resulted in six deaths and other injuries in 2008. One man was paralysed involving an alleged gunshot to his spine. According to Acacia Mining, whose parent company is Barrick Gold, the majority of the claims originated from an incident involving “violent intruders who invaded the mine.”
Legal Aspects
Court cases
In 2013, a group of Tanzanians filed a lawsuit in the UK High Court against Barrick Gold and North Mara Gold mine. The claimants allege that the companies were complicit in killings and injuries of villagers by police and security at the mine, in that the companies failed to prevent the use of excessive force.
After the UK legal proceedings were initiated, a Barrick Gold subsidiary initiated legal proceedings in a local court of Tanzania, asking the court to declare that the company could not be held liable for the actions of the police and security.
After learning about the Tanzanian legal proceedings, the Tanzanian claimants obtained an injunction from the UK court barring the defendants from initiating duplicate proceedings in Tanzania. The English judge criticised Barrick Gold’s Tanzanian proceedings as an attempted “Tanzanian Torpedo” designed to pre-empt the English proceedings. Thus, the proceedings were able to continue in the English High Court.
The International Code of Conduct
The International Code of Conduct requires that Personnel of Member and Affiliate companies take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and if force is used, it should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation. (Rules for the Use of Force : paragraph 29, Use of Force : paragraph 30-32).
Additionally, security personnel are only allowed to apprehend persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence following an attack or crime against Company Personnel, clients, or property under their protection. Apprehension and detention must be consistent with international and national law, and all apprehended and detained persons must be treated humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law. (Detention: paragraph 33)
Further, the International Code of Conduct requires stringent selection and vetting of personnel, assessment of performance and duties (paragraphs 45 to 49), and training of personnel of the Code and relevant international law, including human rights and international criminal law (paragraph 55). Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct, can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
Impact
In an interview with the Financial Post, Mark Bristow, president of Barrick Gold, acknowledged that the company had neglected its relationship with the community, and emphasised a desire to build a mining company “that’s acceptable to future generations.”
In 2015, the lawsuit between the 13 Tanzanian villagers and Barrick Gold regarding deaths and injuries at the North Mara Mine was confidentially settled out of court.
In 2012, Barrick Gold acknowledged the rape problem at the Porgera Mine and created the Porgera Remedy Framework, a non-judicial process organized by the company to hear claims of sexual violence.
Discussion and Reflection Questions
What can a private security company do to “win back the trust” of a community after an incident occurs?
What can a private security company and their client do to handle property intrusions while avoiding unnecessary use of force?
How can private security companies and their clients prevent sexual abuse and exploitation of vulnerable populations?
