Background
Since late 2012, the Central African Republic (CAR) has been under a protracted crisis triggered by the Muslim Seleka rebels’ military campaign against the government. By early 2013, the Seleka rebels took control of Capital city, Bangui by overthrowing then President Francois Bozizé. This resulted in the renewal of clashes between the various armed factions, and reports of widespread human rights abuses, including indiscriminate killings of civilians.
In response, by mid-2013, Christian and animist anti-balaka militias began organising to combat the Seleka rebels. However, these groups associated the Seleka with being Muslim and consequently carried out extensive reprisal attacks against Muslim civilians in Bangui and western regions of the country. By early 2014, the African Union and French forces successfully ousted the Seleka rebels from Bangui. The MINUSCA, the UN peacekeeping mission to CAR, took over the African Union’s mission by September 2014. Despite these interventions, violence and assaults on civilians persisted and the Seleka factionalised.
In 2016, Faustin-Archange Touadéra was elected as the President of CAR. Despite the presence of French troops and UN forces, he struggled to defeat the rebel forces. In 2018, an agreement was signed between the government of CAR and Russian authorities, outlining the training of their forces by Russian “specialists”, composed of primarily former military officers.
The UN, EU, US and France have reported the presence of the Wagner Group in CAR. According to the former Prime Minister of CAR, there was no contract between CAR and a Russian private security company but only a military cooperation agreement with Russia.
The Wagner Group is one of Russia’s most prominent PMCs and functions as “an unofficial (albeit nominally illegal) tool of Russian foreign policy”. It is an umbrella organisation with multiple entities and operations in different parts of the world, often described as Russia’s proxy military force playing a key role in Russia’s war with Ukraine. In January 2023, the US Treasury Department stated that the Group will be designated as a transnational criminal organisation (TCO). In September 2023, a draft order was laid before the UK Parliament to declare the Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation, under the Terrorism Act 2000.
The Wagner Group has protected the leadership of CAR through security enforcement, military training, shipments of weapons and propaganda campaigns for years. In exchange, it gained profitable mining concessions for gold, diamond and timber. In 2023, hundreds of soldiers from the Wagner Group arrived in CAR to “enhance security measures ahead of the country’s upcoming constitutional referendum”. This deployment was reportedly announced by the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), a group which has been linked to the PMC. This group has been labelled by the US as a front company for the Wagner Group’s operations in CAR.
Propaganda and misinformation campaigns have been a tactic employed by Wagner Group to “delegitimise opposition movements and create confusion among the public”. To control the emerging narrative, the Group funded the creation of radio station Lengo Songo which through its broadcasts, advances Russia’s views and ‘legitimises’ Wagner activities in the eye of the local public opinion. Furthermore, through its funds, the Group sponsored and produced films, including a cartoon framing Russian involvement in the CAR as constructive cooperation which showed a “friendly bear helping a lion fight off a group of hyenas” and an action movie filmed in the CAR depicting “Wagner personnel protecting the country from rebels”.
The Incidents
According to UN experts, instructors from the Wagner Group have been intimidating and harassing the civilians, peacekeepers, aid workers and minorities in CAR. UN experts believe that the Wagner Group, along with the local forces, are committing torture, arbitrary detention, summary execution, and more. There have been reports about alleged rape and sexual violence against both men and women. Multiple reports have been made of arbitrary detention and torture. For instance, one of the victims told UN investigators that he was held by a group of Russians, who beat him and cut off one of his fingers.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) first documented cases of abuse by the Russia-linked forces in 2019. According to interviews conducted by the HRW, over 12 civilians mentioned an incident in July 2021, where at least 12 unarmed men were killed by Russian speaking weapon bearers. In another incident, a group of men was accused of being rebels and unlawfully detained by CAR armed forces in inhumane conditions in an open pit at a military base. It was reported that both Russian speaking weapon bearers and CAR soldiers beat five of the detained men.
In May 2023, residents in one of the subdivisions of Bangui went on strike against the “continuous harassment, kidnappings, torture, and intimidation” of the people living in the quarter and the country as a whole by Russian mercenaries of the Wagner security group”.
Human rights violations also occur in other Wagner operating zones including Mali and Sudan. In Mali, women have continuously been targeted by Malian troops and members of foreign security partners. A UN report found that “sexual violence is being used as a war tactic and in a systemic manner” and accused Malian troops and their foreign security partners suspected of including Wagner personnel to have executed 500 people, engaged in sexual violence and torture during an operation in the village of Moura. Additionally, French forces reported Wagner fighters digging and burying bodies in a mass grave. Although they were caught on video, Wagner Group edited the footage with hopes of altering the narrative, wrongfully accusing the French military of the incident and advancing the “anti-French and anti-Western sentiment in Mali”.
Sudan also faces challenges considering the presence of the Group in its rich gold mines. Survivors of the attack reported that miners were killed in a gold mine located between the border of Sudan and CAR while Wagner looted the mine for its resources. Claims state the Wagner troops shot “indiscriminately” killing more than 70 in that single incident.
Legal Aspects
Investigations
Despite the allegations made, there has been no prosecution of any Russian linked forces in CAR. In 2021, a Special Commission of Inquiry was set up by the CAR government. The Commission found that there have been violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including by these Russian instructors.
In 2022, the UN announced that it would be investigating the allegation of the massacre of 10 civilians by Russian mercenaries and CAR army officers in Gordile and Ndah villages.
The question of whether the Wagner Group meets the definition of a PMSC under the Montreux Document or a PSC under the ICoC remains contested. Furthermore, its employees could qualify as mercenaries, under the definition of international humanitarian law. Wagner Group is itself “nebulous because the actors themselves assume amorphous forms”. Wagner Group operates in a grey zone, fluctuating between the two, hence why it is challenging to regulate their conduct and flag observed violations since they engage in such a diverse range of activities.
Although transnational regulations and voluntary industry codes of conduct like the ICoC exist and provide a regulatory framework and mechanism, they also have limits when attempting to regulate actors operating “with significant state backing and secrecy”. Although complicated to define under international law, Wagner may become a model for others, with a continuing emergence of similar groups that stand in this grey zone. However, members of such groups are not immune from prosecutions for war crimes and other international crimes. There are a few ways to address possible crimes perpetrated by such groups, including prosecuting individuals for the commission of international crimes and/or designating the Group as a TCO or terrorist organisation.
The International Code of Conduct
The International Code of Conduct requires that Personnel of Member and Affiliate companies take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force, and if force is used, it should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation. (Rules for the Use of Force: paragraph 29, Use of Force: paragraph 30-32)
Additionally, security personnel are only allowed to apprehend persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence following an attack or crime against Company Personnel, clients, or property under their protection. Apprehension and detention must be consistent with international and national law, and all apprehended and detained persons must be treated humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law and international humanitarian law. (Detention: paragraph 33)
Resources on Apprehending Persons
Under the International Code of Conduct companies cannot allow their personnel to engage in or benefit from sexual exploitation, abuse, or gender-based violence or crimes. Security companies must require their personnel to remain vigilant for all instances of sexual or gender-based violence, and report these instances to competent authorities. (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) or Gender-Based Violence (GBV): paragraph 38)
Guidelines on Preventing and Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
Resources on Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
The Code requires stringent selection and vetting of personnel, assessment of performance and duties (paragraphs 45 to 49), and training of personnel of the Code and relevant international law, including human rights and international criminal law (paragraph 55).
Resources on working conditions
The Code also requires that incident reports are to be made for any incident involving its personnel and the use of weapons, criminal acts, injury to persons, etc. (paragraph 63). It also mandates the establishment of a Grievance, Whistleblowing and related procedures to address claims brought by personnel or of third parties regarding the failure of the Company to respect the principles mentioned in the Code (paragraph 66-67).
Meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct can help private security companies and their clients ensure that private security personnel are qualified, trained, supported, informed, and responsible.
See also: The Montreux Document On pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict; Article 47 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions; United Nations International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 2001; Organisation of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, 1977.
Impact
The US Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on eight individuals and entities that it believes are responsible for expanding Russia’s influence in CAR. The EU has also sanctioned individuals that it believes to be involved in the Wagner Group’s activities. In 2021, the EU said that it would no longer train CAR soldiers due to their links to the Wagner Group. In April 2022, the Human Rights Watch wrote to the Russian foreign minister and the government of CAR seeking information on the presence of Wagner Group in the country and the status of forces agreement between Russia and CAR.
Following the death of its two main leaders, Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin in 2023, the Group has morphed into a new entity named Africa Corps led by Wagner veteran Anton Yelizarov. Although its affiliations to Russia was ambiguous under the former guise of Wagner, Africa Corps has been clearly presented as a subsidiary paramilitary organisation of the Russian Federation under the pretence of defending its people and its interest. Russia’s direct involvement in the Africa Corps operations could be an attempt to avoid allowing the Group to grow in autonomy and power and challenge the Russian authorities again, as it did during Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023. Africa Corps also drives Russia’s foreign policy, meaning the advancement of the country’s military strategy in the African continent. Moreover, experts say that because Africa Corps report to Russia’s Defence Ministry, there exists a possibility for them to be held accountable by Russia for violations perpetrated by troops during military operations.
Discussion
What is the definition of a PMSC? Of a PSC? Does the Wagner group meet this definition? Does the Group under its new name of “Africa Corps” meet this definition?
Do the military advisors employed by Wagner qualify as mercenaries under international law?
How can members of private security companies can be held accountable for their alleged crimes?
What are the implications when a private security company is contracted to work in a volatile and complex environment like CAR?
Discuss the importance of conducting human rights due diligence when outside contractors are introduced to a complex conflict-ridden setting.
Sources
- Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) | Congressional Research Service
- CAR: Russian Wagner Group Harassing and Intimidating Civilians – UN Experts | OHCHR
- Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces | Human Rights Watch
- CAR: Capital Quarter on Strike over Atrocities by Russian Mercenaries | HumAngle
- CAR: Wagner Forces Arrive in CAR Despite Uncertainty over Their Future | HumAngle
- UN Asks C.Africa to Take Action over Russian Torture Case | France24
- Russian Mercenaries Behind Human Rights Abuses in CAR, Say UN experts | The Guardian
- Wagner Group: Why the EU is Alarmed by Russian Mercenaries in Central Africa | BBC News
- Battle for Influence Rages in Heart of Wagner’s Operations in Africa | The New York Times
- UK to Declare Wagner Group a Terrorist Organisation | The Guardian
- Russian Mercenaries Behind Slaughter in Mali Village | The Guardian
- Russian Wagner Group Declared Terrorists | GOV.UK
- Why Wagner is Winning Hearts in the Central African Republic | BBC News
- Wagner Forces Arrive CAR Despite Uncertainty over Their Future | HumAngle
- Understanding the US Designation of the Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organisation | FDD
- Wagner, PMSCs, and the Limits of Transnational Governance | Lawfare
- Russian Proxy or Rogue Mercenary Army? Situating the Wagner Group | IMSISS
- The Wagner Group: Options for Justice | Geneva Academy: IHL Talks
- Russia’s Wagner Group Expands into Africa’s Sahel with a New Brand | CNBC
- Russia’s Africa Corps – More than Old Wine in a New Bottle | Institute for Security Studies
- UN Reports Sexual Violence in Mali; Russian Wagner Group Implicated | Council on Foreign Relations
- Russian Mercenaries Staged Atrocities in Mali, France Says | Foreign Policy
- The Wagner Group’s Atrocities in Africa: Lies and Truth | U.S. Department of State
- Moving Out of the Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations Around the World | The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
- The Wagner Group, Russia’s Foreign Policy and Sub-Saharan Africa | The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
- Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) | Congressional Research Service
- Russian Proxy or Rogue Mercenary Army? Situating the Wagner Group
This case was prepared by Anyssa Boyer, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
